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. Robinson LADB News Analyst At first glance, the current embroglio in Nicaragua appears too
multifarious and enigmatic to understand. The government is embroiled in a corruption scandal
which threatens to bring down the administration of President Violeta Chamorro. The economic
recovery program so painstakingly implemented over the past two years is in danger of being gutted
by the US decision to delay disbursement of aid. For the first time since Chamorro was elected in
1990, Sandinista leaders are talking of "taking up arms" once again. Workers and students battle
police. Widespread conflict continues in the countryside. And so on. Behind these events lie clear
protagonists with hidden, as well as not-so-hidden, agendas. The underlying political dynamic at
work in Nicaragua at this time is an alliance between the United States and the Nicaraguan rightwing, led by a handful of ambitious politicians, aimed at breaking the center-left alliance that has
gelled over the past year around Chamorro's program of national reconciliation and reconstruction.
Background to the current crisis The National Opposition Union (UNO) hammered together by the
US and united only in its opposition to the Sandinistas, began to fragment shortly after winning the
1990 elections. Centrist forces led by President Violeta Chamorro and Presidency Minister Antonio
Lacayo captured the executive while the legislature became dominated by the right. Despite the
crisis engulfing their own party, the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) remained the
main political force in the country, with 42% of the seats in the National Assembly, a mass social
base, a nation-wide political infrastructure, and the ability to rally as well as to temper popular
protest. The incoming Chamorro government adopted policies of national reconciliation and
"concertacion" based on pragmatic calculations: working with the Sandinistas to achieve social
peace was seen as the only viable basis for stability, economic recovery and reconstruction. These
policies laid the basis for an alliance between the left (the FSLN) and the center. And in recent
months, the executive and the FSLN have taken concrete steps to consolidate, and formalize, their
working alliance. However, this alliance ran up against the rabid anti- Sandinista sensibilities of the
right-wing, represented by most of the political parties affiliated with UNO, which have accused
Chamorro of entering into "an illegal and immoral marriage" with the Sandinistas. Moreover, the
old oligarchic forces and certain sectors within the business community saw their agenda for a
speedy counterrevolutionary restoration of the pre-1979 status quo frustrated. The development
of a center-left alliance thus weakened the right. It also represented a major impediment to the
personal ambitions of Alfredo Cesar and several other important political figures in Nicaragua.
The US Agenda The US agenda for Nicaragua has converged with the Chamorro government on
some issues and clashed on others. Washington achieved only the first step in this agenda when
the FSLN was voted out of power. The next step was to implement the neo-liberal project. This
project entails dismantling much of the structural transformations undertaken during the Sandinista
revolution, and in particular, reversing the radical change in property relations that took place
between 1979-1990. It also means neutralizing Sandinista influence in state and society in order
to preempt popular or left challenges to the neo-liberal model. Moreover, the neo-liberal project
requires a repressive instrument to contain the social protest that its implementation inevitably
generates. A Sandinista-dominated army and police force is an obstacle to overall US plans for
Nicaragua. Washington has carefully designed its aid programs and its diplomacy (both public
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and discrete) to achieve this agenda. Aid has been conditioned on step-by-step implementation of
neo-liberal structural adjustment, including trade liberalization, privatization, budget cuts, credit
restrictions, and so on. The Chamorro government sees eye-to-eye with Washington regarding the
broad contours of neo-liberalism, but seeks to maneuver between the US and the FSLN in setting
its own priorities regarding the details and terms of implementation. In particular, it has a different
view on the property issue. The Chamorro administration envisions privatization as a delicate, longterm process, based less on a wholesale return to pre-1979 property relations than on a "New Right"
modernization which builds on many of the revolution's social and structural transformations
while transferring hegemony to the "modernizing elite." The US diplomatic pressures to dismiss
army chief Gen. Humberto Ortega, police chief Rene Vivas, and other Sandinista officials from
their posts in the armed forces and police began on the day Violeta Chamorro was inaugurated in
April 1990. US Asst. Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Bernard Aronson, who headed
the Bush administration's delegation to the inauguration ceremonies, asserted that aid would be
conditioned on such a purge. But he later indicated that this was only a US "preference" and not
a condition. At the time, it was clear to informed observers that this issue was merely put on hold,
and would come back to haunt the government further down the road. Since Chamorro took office,
the Sandinista Popular Army (EPS) has been reduced from 90,000 to less than 20,000 troops. Under
Gen. Ortega's doctrine of "constitutionalism," the EPS has been depoliticized and placed under the
control of the executive. Ironically, the army and police, under Sandinista command and following
orders from the government, have become increasingly effective in suppressing popular protests
in the cities and the countryside. Even so, Gen. Ortega has been unable to win the confidence
of the US or the Nicaraguan right. These two issues property relations and Sandinista influence
have been a source of ongoing friction between Washington and the Chamorro government. But
they also form the basis for a convergence between the US and the Nicaraguan right-wing. US
alliance with the right-wing Alfredo Cesar and his loyalists are at the center of the current crisis. In
Nicaragua, Cesar has earned the nickname "backstabber" for engaging in ever-shifting alliances
and his repeated betrayal of former allies. Cesar, whose self-declared life ambition is to become
president, joined his brother-in-law, Antonio Lacayo, in managing the Chamorro campaign during
the 1989-1990 electoral process. At the time he was one of the select members of the Chamorro
inner circle. With the support of the executive (and the FSLN), Cesar was elected president of the
National Assembly in 1991. Shortly afterwards, he broke with Lacayo and the center and seized the
leadership of the boisterous right-wing, whose leader until then had been Vice President Virgilio
Godoy. To understand Cesar's current motives, it is necessary to take a closer look at the man who
is seen by many as the shrewdest and most ambitious politician in Nicaragua. A few days after the
Sandinista triumph in July 1979, Cesar and some of his associates, among them, his "right-hand
man," Guillermo Potoy, and Pedro Joaquin Chamorro Barrios, formed the Social Democratic Party
(PSD). The PSD's stated objective at that time was to compete with the FSLN for recognition from
the Socialist International, a goal which it never achieved. When Cesar went into self-imposed
exile in 1981 to join the contra movement, he left Potoy in charge of the PSD. During his years in
the US-funded contra movement, Cesar became well-connected in Washington, and particularly
ingratiated himself to staunch contra supporters such as Jeanne Kirkpatrick and Sen. Jesse Helms
(R-NC), the same ones now pushing hardest for the suspension of US aid. When Cesar returned
from exile in 1989 to help lead the UNO electoral campaign, he placed his bets on forging a centerright coalition in Nicaragua as his own power base. During the electoral process, Cesar and Potoy
were put in charge of the CIA's "Nicaraguan Exile Reintegration Program" (NERP). The two used
NERP funds to build their own base of loyalists. Following the elections, Cesar had Potoy appointed
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to the post of Comptroller General. However, the gradual forging of a center-left coalition between
Lacayo and the Sandinistas undercut Cesar's ambitions, and helped spur his defection to the right.
In the process, Cesar has become the most vociferous and hard-line opponent of the Chamorro
government and has levelled increasingly bitter attacks against Antonio Lacayo. Cesar and the
right-wing want the heads of Antonio Lacayo, as the architect of the national reconciliation project
and the center-left alliance, and of Gen. Humberto Ortega and other Sandinista military officials,
as key vestiges of institutionalized Sandinista influence in the country. Not surprisingly, Cesar's
two key projects have been to push for the "purge" of Sandinistas from the armed forces and
the police, and to introduce legislation in the National Assembly which would revert property
relations in the country to the pre-1979 period. However, Cesar is not particularly committed to
these issues based on ideological or programmatic reasons. His overriding commitment is to his
own ambitions. By becoming the "point man" in Nicaragua for the US agenda, Cesar has set himself
up as the centripetal figure in a power struggle against the executive. The picture is not complete
without a comment on the right-wing UNO parties with representatives in the National Assembly.
Most of the 14 parties that make up the coalition are descendants of the traditional liberal and
conservative parties that ruled Nicaragua following independence from Spain until 1979. Most of
the representatives are "old guard" politicians, well-groomed in the country's traditional political
culture of back-room deals and inter-elite pacts. Agendas are often determined less by ideology,
political principles, or programs than momentary power plays and attempts to satisfy personal
ambitions. This explains the ever-shifting alliances, backstabbing and infighting in Nicaragua's
unpredictable politics, of which Cesar is master. Cesar's gambit After losing several battles in the
National Assembly last year to have his property rights legislation passed, Cesar and his loyalists
launched a new offensive starting in March 1992. In that month, Cesar travelled to Washington, DC,
where he met with chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Colin Powell and with Secretary of
State James Baker. He presented them with a plan to restructure the National Police. In a revealing
intrigue, a blueprint of the plan was provided, without executive authorization, to Cesar on the
eve of his trip by Interior Minister Carlos Hurtado. Hurtado is another Cesar confidant and a PSD
leader. The unauthorized disclosure cost Hurtado his ministerial post. Two months later, Cesar
was back in Washington to meet with Jeanne Kirkpatrick, to whom he provided "information"
regarding alleged "misuse" of US aid by the Chamorro administration, including the "channelling
of funds to Sandinista organizations." Kirkpatrick published the charges in her syndicated column,
which then provided grist for the campaign by Sen. Helms and others in Washington to freeze
aid to Nicaragua. On his return to Managua, Cesar told reporters: "The United States continues
to be concerned about some fundamental problems, like the property issue, the armed forces
and police questions and the topic of economic growth, which can't take place in an unstable
environment." He added that he would soon introduce new property legislation in the National
Assembly, and once again called on Gen. Ortega to resign. Cesar is largely credited with having
incited the suspension of US aid and the current crisis. His gambit entails a high risk calculation.
On the one hand, if he is fingered as the culprit for the spiralling national crisis, his candidacy
in the next presidential election would be in jeopardy. On the other hand, Cesar stands to gain
if he manages to force a significant realignment of the country's political forces, not to mention
the benefits of currying Washington's favor. The current crisis The current crisis hinges around
two closely-related events. First is the suspension of US aid in June. The Bush administration is
using the delay as blackmail in pushing its concerns on property issues and a purge of Sandinistas
from the military. The underlying intent is to force a definitive break the center-left alliance in
Nicaragua. The second is the corruption scandal. On July 17, Comptroller General Guillermo
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Potoy released the results of his office's investigation into government corruption. The report
accuses former deputy presidency minister Antonio Ibarra of embezzling over US$1 million from
a special anti- poverty fund and using some of the money to buy the votes of a group of National
Assembly deputies against Alfredo Cesar's property bills. Although Nicaraguan by birth, Ibarra
left the country in the early 1970s and became a US citizen. He worked closely during the 1980s
with the Reagan administration, and with such groups as the World Anti-Communist League
(WACL) and the Moonies in promoting the contra program. He returned to Nicaragua during the
1989-1990 electoral campaign to advise UNO, and reportedly acted as a conduit for CIA and other
clandestine US programs in coordination with Cesar's faction and the NERP program. Following
the election, he was appointed deputy minister of the presidency. He fled for Miami when rumors
of embezzlement first surfaced last December. Embezzlement, bribes and fraud are nothing new
to Nicaragua's traditional vice-ridden political culture. However, as Chamorro herself pointed out,
Potoy, in more than two years in office, had done nothing to investigate corruption until it involved
the executive branch. More significantly, the report implicates Lacayo directly as sharing "joint
criminal liability" with Ibarra due to "negligence" in failing to put a stop to Ibarra's dealings. The
investigation and report have led to fresh volleys against Lacayo and Chamorro from the rightwing which has found new and more potent ammunition in its campaign. Shady dealings out of
Ibarra's office are more than plausible. So too is Ibarra's claim that he was asked by Cesar and his
followers to implicate Lacayo in the scandal. Even more plausible, however, are Antonio Lacayo's
charges that, whatever corruption might have taken place in Ibarra's office, the issue has become a
"political trap" in Cesar's agenda against the Chamorro administration. According to Lacayo, Cesar
and the other PSD leaders worked with Potoy on the report, in a "conflict of interests" between
their party and government responsibilities. He also criticized PSD leader Pedro Joaquin Chamorro
Barrios, an editor of daily newspaper La Prensa, for publishing parts of the report before Potoy
had even publicly released it. By declaring on July 17 that she herself would resign before firing
Lacayo, Violeta Chamorro has raised the ante. Some observers don't rule out that the whole affair
could snowball, culminating in the collapse of the current government. Situation of ungovernability
Against this backdrop, rumors circulated in mid-July of secret negotiations in Managua over Gen.
Ortega's replacement. The Sandinistas are acutely aware that the dismissal of Gen. Ortega, and of
police chief Rene Vivas, would not represent routine rotation or retirement of officers, but the most
crucial step in resurrecting a repressive military force under the right's control. The Sandinistas fear
that they and their followers would be the primary targets of such a force in the hands of the right,
whose primordial goal remains the elimination of Sandinismo. This is what motivated their threats
to take up arms once again. Meanwhile, the non-resolution of the property issue is the underlying
source of chronic conflict in the countryside. The deadlock means ongoing insecurity for hundreds
of thousands of beneficiaries of the Sandinista agrarian reform. It has placed the government in a
situation where it is unable, or unwilling, to follow through on its commitments to provide land to
tens of thousands of demobilized contras and Sandinistas, and to effectively integrate them into
the rural production process. The recent strikes and violent protests by students and workers in the
cities can be seen as a prelude to more intense conflict should the suspension of US aid drag on.
Prolonging the aid freeze would undermine the macroeconomic stability so painstakingly achieved
over the past two years, implying even greater sacrifices from the popular sectors. According to
Finance Minister Emilio Pereira, if the aid is delayed beyond September, the government will be
forced to declare a "national economic emergency." Beyond gutting the hopes of moving from
economic stabilization to reactivation, such a scenario is a recipe for much more serious civil conflict.
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